

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report

Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module

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1 Summary

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements *[AC]*, the developer's Impact Analysis Report *[IAR]* and evaluator's assessment *[EA]*. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report *[CR]*, the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the NSCIB under CC-22-195307.

The changes to the certified product are related to a minor change in the software not impacting the security functionality of the certified product (i.e. adding bootloader version 1.1.5). The identification of the maintained product is modified to Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module and Firmware, Bootloader, and Hardware versions as documented in the *[ST]*.

Consideration of the nature of the changes leads to the conclusion that they can be classified as minor changes and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report *[CR]* is maintained for the new version of the product.

This report is an addendum to the Certification Report NSCIB-CC-195307-CR2 [CR] and reproduction is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.



2 Assessment

2.1 Introduction

The IT product identified in this report was assessed according to the Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements [AC], the developer's Impact Analysis Report [IAR] and evaluator's assessment [EA]. delete if no evaluator activity has been performed. The baseline for this assessment was the Certification Report [CR], the Security Target and the Evaluation Technical Report of the product certified by the NSCIB under CC-22-195307.

On 31 January 2023 Thales DIS CPL Canada Inc submitted a request for assurance maintenance for the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module.

NSCIB has assessed the *[IAR]* according to the requirements outlined in the document Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements *[AC]*.

In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes (i) the changes made to the certified TOE, (ii) the evidence updated as a result of the changes and (iii) the security impact of the changes.

This is supported by the evaluator's assessment [EA].

2.2 Description of Changes

The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module (i.e. the TOE) is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI-E card (Thales Luna PCIe HSM). It is operated in a controlled environment and can be used either as a standalone device to be inserted in a server, or as a device embedded in a Thales Luna Network HSM.

The TOE is also suitable for use in support of electronic signature and electronic sealing operations, certificate issuance and revocation, time stamp operations, and authentication services, as identified by the (EU) No 910/2014 regulation [EU-REG] of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS). For that purpose, the Security Target has been explicitly written to comply with [PP 419221-5]; the TOE supports Assigned Keys, External Key Storage and Key Import/Export operations as defined in the PP.

The changes to the certified product as described in the *[IAR]* are only related to adding another bootloader version. This update to the software was classified by developer *[IAR]* and original evaluator *[EA]* as minor changes with no impact on security.

There are no changes in the software and hardware component of the TOE, except for adding another bootloader version (v1.1.5). All other bootloader, firmware and hardware versions remain unchanged.

The TOE name has not changed except for references to bootloader versions. Therefore, the name is still 'Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module' with references to firmware versions (unchanged), bootloader versions (1.1.5 added), and hardware versions (unchanged). Guidance documentation has been updated to reflect the added bootloader version.

The configuration list for the TOE has been updated as a result of the changes to include the updated Security Target [ST].



3 Conclusion

Consideration of the nature of the changes leads to the conclusion that they can be classified as minor changes and that certificate maintenance is the correct path to continuity of assurance.

The resistance to attacks has not been re-assessed in the course of this maintenance process. Therefore, the assurance as outlined in the Certification Report *[CR]* is maintained for this version of the product.

4 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report:

[AC]	Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, 2012-06-01, Version 2.1, June 2012
[AGD_PRE]	Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part1: Preparative Procedures, 007-013968-001, Revision J, 09 December 2022
[AGD_OPE_P2]	Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part2: Operational Guidance (General), 007-000465-001, Revision J, 09 December 2022
[AGD_OPE_P3]	Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part3: eIDAS Guidance, 007-000466-001, Revision J, 09 December 2022
[AGD_OPE_P4]	Thales Luna K7(+) Cryptographic Module, Common Criteria User Guidance – Part4: TOE Integration for use in Composite Evaluation, 007-000467-001, Revision H, 09 December 2022
[CR]	Certification Report Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module, NSCIB-CC- 195307-CR2, v1.0, 18 July 2022
[EA]	Evaluator Assessment of Changes Report (EAR] Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - Partial ETR, 23-RPT-205, v2.0, 13 March 2023
[IAR]	Impact Analysis Report Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module Update to add bootloader 1.1.5, 002-000471-001, Rev A, 20 August 2022
[ETR]	Evaluation Technical Report Thales Luna K7/K7+ - EAL4+, 22-RPT-159, v5.0, 07 March 2023
[ETRfC]	Evaluation Technical Report for Composition Thales Luna K7/K7+ - EAL4+, 22-RPT-721, v4.0, 07 March 2023
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28 March 2019
[ST]	Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - Security Target, 002-010985-001, Rev N, 09 December 2022

(This is the end of this report).